This report will address four issues in NATO`s debate in the Pacific. First, is there a historical precedent for a Pacific NATO? This report finds precedent in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), although it was largely unsuccessful due to its lack of regional adoption, weak mutual defense rules, and was eventually spoiled by the Vietnam War. Second, would such an alliance be necessary given the plethora of existing multilateral partnerships in the region? While there is a vast multilateral landscape in Indopazifik, there is currently no agreement combining both the far-reaching and deep commitments of a hypothetical Pacific NATO. Quad and RIMPAC, however, bring together many of the major Indo-Pacific powers and serve as an important foundation for U.S. multilateral regional security. Third, how could such an alliance be structured? The report examines three options: extending NATO`s mandate beyond Europe, extending its Enhanced Opportunity Partner (EOP) programme and creating a new system of alliances. It also uses the case of Montenegro`s accession to NATO to establish a wide range of criteria for future membership. Fourth, how would Indo-Pacific nations, including China, react to such an alliance? That would be extremely difficult. China has considerable economic influence over its closest allies such as Australia and Japan.
Internal disputes are numerous, especially between South Korea and Japan and four nations – Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam – with competing claims in the South China Sea. Two of the United States` main partners in the region, India and Singapore, have a long-standing aversion to this type of alliance system. And for recent partners like Malaysia and Indonesia, the promise of value is even less clear. The Chinese will likely respond to all attempts at a multilateral military alliance in their backyard with a state effort to stop it. If this alliance includes Taiwan, it could lead to even more aggressive actions. After its creation, SEATO quickly became militarily insignificant, as most of its member countries contributed very little to the alliance. [17] While seato`s armed forces underwency in joint military training, they were never deployed due to internal differences. SEATO was unable to intervene in the conflicts in Laos because France and the United Kingdom refused to resort to military action. [18] As a result, the United States unilaterally supported Laos after 1962. [18] Although sought by the United States, SEATO`s participation in the Vietnam War was rejected due to a lack of British and French cooperation. [20] [18] Opposition to the Philippines` U.S.
Mutual Defense Treaty has had its rules on both sides of the Pacific. . . .